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Evidence. Tancrelle v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 756 A.2d 744
(R.I. 2000). Premises liability action against restaurant allegedly
as a result of a fall by plaintiff down defendant's rotted staircase.
On appeal from a superior court verdict in favor of the plaintiff for
$1,682,279, the Rhode Island Supreme Court denied defendant's
appeal and affirmed judgment for the plaintiff indicating that will-
ful destruction of relevant evidence is admissible against a party to
demonstrate the inference that the evidence may have been unfa-
vorable to the spoliator.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On May 27, 1993, Marc Tancrelle (Tancrelle or plaintiff), a
master plumber working for Greenwood Heating, Plumbing & So-
lar, Inc. (Greenwood), was sent to Friendly Ice Cream Corpora-
tion's (Friendly or defendant) East Providence restaurant
(restaurant or store) to install a hot water heater in the basement.1
Upon his arrival, Tancrelle met with the store manager, Dolores
O'Brien (O'Brien), who showed him the water heater at the rear of
the kitchen. 2 The water heater supplied by Friendly and not by
Greenwood, was to be installed in the restaurant's basement. 3
From the kitchen, a winding staircase went down to the basement,
but the water heater was too large to fit through the door at the top
of the staircase.4 Moreover, Tancrelle stated that the water heater
would have to be uncrated and would take two men to bring it
down to the basement.5 Tancrelle then inquired to O'Brien about a
bulkhead, which O'Brien acknowledged existed.6 Tancrelle opted
to use the bulkhead since it would be easier to maneuver than the
winding, kitchen staircase.7 He then walked down the winding
staircase to the basement and unlatched the bolt securing the
bulkhead door.8 "As he turned to walk down the bulkhead stairs,
the top stair gave way and Tancrelle fell, hitting his back at least
twice before landing on the bottom step, which also gave way."9
1. See Tancrelle v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 756 A.2d 744, 746 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. Id.
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While looking up to see what happened, Tancrelle noticed the
stringers were damaged and appeared to be rotted.10 Plaintiff tes-
tified that the stringers, apparently damaged from water leaking
into the bulkhead, caused him to fall." Tancrelle then went back
to the kitchen, told O'Brien about his fall and showed her the dam-
aged bulkhead staircase.' 2 Tancrelle also testified that O'Brien
conveyed to him that the stairs had rotted because of water leaking
into the basement for the past three years; a statement which
O'Brien later disputed.' 3 Following the incident, Tancrelle's co-
worker from Greenwood, Dennis Reddy (Reddy) arrived at the res-
taurant where he helped Tancrelle install the new unit, using the
kitchen staircase, and helped Tancrelle remove the existing water
heater.' 4 Plaintiffs pain from the incident gradually increased
over the next few days and ultimately resulted in an unsuccessful
surgery for a herniated disk in May 1994.15
At trial, the restaurant's general manager, James Beland (Be-
land) testified that the store's bulkhead had not been used during
his three years there. 16 He further testified that he was unaware
of the majority of the events that occurred on May 25, 1993 and
only learned of the accident when he received a letter from Tan-
crelle's attorney.' 7 Beland informed his superiors of the possible
claim, took statements from the employees on duty that day and
photographed the damaged stairs.18 He stated at trial that no
damage to the stairs was evident, save for the last step that
seemed to be off its support on one side, which he secured with a
piece of wood.19 When probed further, Beland admitted the bulk-
head stairs had been used in November 1993 when a shipment of
gift boxes was delivered.20 He also indicated that the stairs did, in
fact, shift about two or three inches and subsequently gave way
from its use.21 He reported the condition of the bulkhead stairs to
10. See id. at 746-47.
11. See id. at 747.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 747-48.
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defendant, which resulted in the subsequent removal and replace-
ment of the stairs.22
Also in November 1993, Greenwood received another service
call from the restaurant, this time to repair a leak in the base-
ment.23 On November 18, 1993, Michael Zolkos (Zolkos) arrived at
the restaurant to repair the leak.2 4 Per order of his supervisors at
Greenwood, Zolkos was given a camera and was instructed to take
pictures of the damaged, bulkhead stairs. 25 Zolkos testified at trial
that the three bottom stairs were in overall bad shape and the
other stairs seemed to be rotted.26 After photographing the stairs,
Zolkos put the camera in his car and returned to repair the leak in
the basement.2 7 However, he was confronted by a Friendly em-
ployee, who demanded Zolkos turn over the pictures of defendant's
property. 28 Zolkos complied, after speaking with his supervisor,
and the photographs never again appeared. 29 Shortly after turn-
ing over the camera to Friendly, a crew arrived to remove and re-
place the bulkhead stairs.30
Tancrelle filed a suit in negligence on October 17, 1994 in
Providence County Superior Court and a trial was held from May
18, 1999 to June 4, 1999.31 The jury returned a verdict in favor of
Tancrelle with an award totaling $1,682,279.32 Friendly's motion
for a new trial was denied and the defendant filed this subsequent
appeal.33
BACKGROUND
In cases involving spoliation, the court is concerned with the
"deliberate or negligent destruction of relevant evidence by a party
to litigation [which] may give rise to an inference that the de-
22. See id. at 748.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
SURVEY SECTION
stroyed evidence was unfavorable to that party."34 With the doc-
trine of spoliation, "all things are presumed against a despoiler or
wrongdoer."35 Furthermore, while a showing of bad faith is not
essential to a claim of spoliation, it may strengthen the inference of
such an occurrence. 36 When asserting the doctrine of spoliation, "a
party is not required to establish that missing evidence would be
admissible at trial, but rather must show that the evidence is rele-
vant and that it is unavailable because of the conduct of the
despoiler."37
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial justice erred in al-
lowing plaintiff to present evidence of spoliation: specifically, the
fact that the defendant not only replaced the rotted stairs but
failed to preserve those rotted stairs for plaintiffs expert when de-
fendant knew the current litigation had already commenced. 38 De-
fendant also challenged the allowance of evidence regarding its
inability to produce employee work schedules and the admittance
of evidence regarding Zolkos's confiscated photographs taken on
the day the stairs disappeared.39 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court commented that it was the destruction of the rotted stairs,
not their removal, that gave rise to the trial judge's spoliation in-
struction to the jury.40 Beginning in June 1993, defendant was on
notice of plaintiffs potential cause of action and its failure to notify
Tancrelle "of the impending remedial action and to afford plaintiff
an opportunity to physically inspect the condition of the stairs may
give rise to the permissible inference that the condition of the
stairs was harmful to Friendly's defense."41 At a minimum, defen-
dant should have maintained possession of the rotted staircase in
light of Tancrelle's alleged injuries from his fall down the stairs.42
34. Id. at 748 (quoting R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. E. Gen. Contractors,
Inc., 674 A.2d 1227, 1234 (R.I. 1996)).
35. Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1086 (6th ed. 1990)).
36. See id. (citing Farrell v. Connetti Trailer Sales, Inc., 727 A.2d 183, 186
(R.I. 1999)).
37. Id. at 751.
38. See id. at 748.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 749.
41. Id.
42. See id.
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"An obligation to preserve evidence even arises prior to the filing of
a complaint where a party is on notice that litigation is likely
.... 4Defendant's deliberate and negligent behavior resulted in
prejudice to plaintiff, who was deprived of the opportunity to pre-
sent expert testimony regarding the condition of the rotted stairs
and who was only left with inferences to convey to the jury.44
Defendant also contested the trial justice's evidentiary deci-
sion regarding the missing daily work schedules of defendant's em-
ployees, which were requested by plaintiff during discovery in
1994.45 Friendly offered that failure to produce the requested doc-
uments did not rise to the level of spoliation since it was company
routine to retain the data for "so long a period of time," a defense
theory that was not presented at trial.46 Contrary to this asser-
tion, defendant presented evidence at trial that indicated such
records were kept for a three-year period-well within the time
frame of the date of the incident in 1993 to plaintiff's request of the
items in 1994. 47 The supreme court indicated the trial justice ap-
propriately admitted evidence that defendant's actions during dis-
covery regarding the employee work schedules "clearly gave rise to
the inference that defendant deliberately deprived plaintiff of that
evidence."48
The admission of testimony regarding the missing photo-
graphs taken from Zolkos, plaintiffs co-worker, on the day the
damaged stairs were removed and replaced, was also disputed by
defendant.49 This argument, however, was neither addressed by
nor objected to at trial by the defendant and, accordingly, cannot
be argued for the first time on appeal.50 The supreme court did
comment that evidence regarding the missing photographs was ap-
propriate since because of the misbehavior of the defendant's em-
43. Id. (quoting Conderman v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 687 N.Y.S.2d 213,
217 (1998)).
44. See id.
45. See id. at 750.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 751.
50. See id. (citing Fiske v. MacGregor, Division of Brunswick, 464 A.2d 719,
726 (R.I. 1983)); Super. Group Ventures, Inc. v. Apollo II Sign Corp., 712 A.2d 359,
360 (R.I. 1998)).
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ployee, defendant cannot contend that the value of the evidence
presented may be inconclusive. 51
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in affirming a trial judge's
decision that introduction of intentionally or negligently destroyed
evidence may be permitted against the destructing party to show
an inference that the evidence was unfavorable to the spoliator,
commented that:
it is apparent that both the court and the jury caught a whiff
of something foul with regard to the defendant's inability or
unwillingness to produce and preserve relevant evidence.
The odor of an orchestrated effort on the part of defendant to
suppress relevant evidence that was harmful to defendant's
case may have been detected.5 2
The court found no error with the trial judge's admittance of the
spoliated evidence or with his instruction to the jury.
Danielle T. Jenkins
51. See id.
52. Id.
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Evidence. United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113 (1st Cir.
2000). When Rule 404(b) is offered to show a common plan, it
must suggest a continuing or connected scheme between the prior
act and the current crime. Also, 404(b) evidence may not be admit-
ted to show motive. Further, 404(b) evidence may be admitted to
show a co-conspirator relationship when both the prior bad act and
the current crime involved the same participants. Finally, such ev-
idence may also be allowed to indicate the nature and development
of the relationship between persons acting as co-conspirators in the
current crime, even if no such co-conspirator relationship existed
in the previous act. However, any evidence deemed admissible
under Rule 404(b) will be precluded by Rule 403 if the probative
value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1991, the defendant, George Varoudakis opened a restau-
rant and nightclub in Boston, Massachusetts, called Destinations.'
On April 4, 1995, the restaurant burned as a result of what investi-
gators determined to be arson.2 Varoudakis was charged with ar-
son and conspiracy to commit arson in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(I) and 18 U.S.C. § 371, as police believed he hired someone to
burn the restaurant down in order to collect insurance proceeds. 3
At trial, the prosecution's chief witness, Varoudakis's long-
time girlfriend and general manager of Destinations, Cheryl Britt,
testified that at the end of March 1995, Varoudakis hired an ac-
quaintance to burn the building.4 Britt also testified that
Varoudakis told her, prior to the arson attempt, that he increased
the insurance so he could burn the facility and collect the insur-
ance proceeds. 5 The trial court also permitted Britt to testify that
in December 1993 she saw Varoudakis set fire to an automobile
that he had leased.6 According to Britt, Varoudakis told her his
1. See United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 116 (1st Cir. 2000).
2. See id. at 117.
3. See id. at 116.
4. See id. at 116-17.
5. See id. at 116.
6. See id. at 118.
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lease had expired, he owed excess mileage charges and he expected
insurance to cover the loss. 7
Prior to opening statements, the defense filed a motion in
limine to attempt to exclude the car fire evidence.8 The court ruled
that Britt's testimony would be admitted on three grounds. 9 First,
the evidence was relevant to show Varoudakis's "plan, knowledge,
and intent" in relation to whether he "knowingly participated in a
common scheme to defraud." 10 Second, the evidence was pertinent
to show that Britt acted as Varoudakis's co-conspirator in both the
car fire and the Destinations fire. 1 Third, the testimony was rele-
vant to Varoudakis's motive to commit the Destinations fire, be-
cause in both instances he allegedly committed arson to alleviate a
financial burden by collecting insurance proceeds.' 2
The jury deliberated in the case for three days. 13 At the end of
the second half-day of deliberations, the jury wrote the court a note
saying it was at an impasse and asked for further instructions. 14
The court told the jury to stop for the day and resume deliberations
the next day.' 5 After another day and a half of deliberations, the
jury convicted Varoudakis on both counts.' 6 He appealed his con-
viction on grounds that the car fire evidence should not have been
admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because its sole
purpose was to demonstrate criminal propensity. 17 Alternatively,
he asserted that the evidence should not have been admitted under
Rule 403 because its probative value was substantially outweighed
by its unfairly prejudicial effect.' 8 The government responded that
the car fire evidence was properly admitted, or, if not, that its ad-
mission was harmless error.19
7. See id.
8. See id. at 119.
9. See id. at 119-20.
10. Id. at 119.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 120.
13. See id. at 126.
14. See id. at 117.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 117-18.
17. See id. at 118.
18. See id.
19. See id.
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BACKGROUND
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that evidence of a
defendant's prior bad acts may not be admitted to prove his crimi-
nal character or propensity to commit crimes of the sort for which
he is on trial.20 To admit 404(b) evidence, a court must find that
the evidence has some "special relevance" to an issue in the case
such as intent or knowledge and must not be mere evidence of bad
character. 21 Additionally, prior bad acts may be admitted in con-
spiracy cases under 404(b) if they explain the background, forma-
tion and development of the illegal relationship. 22
Once a court determines that the evidence has some "special
relevance" it must then apply Rule 403 to determine if the proba-
tive value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice. 23 If it is, the evidence shall not be
admitted. 24 Unfair prejudice may include the possibility of confu-
sion of issues or misleading of the jury, or considerations of undue
delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence. 25 Also, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled in
United States v. Gilbert26 that the probative value of 404(b) evi-
dence is diminished in a 403 analysis when other, non-prejudicial
evidence is available to substantiate the relevant fact the 404(b)
evidence is being offered to prove. 27
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the court addressed the three bases the district
court relied on to admit Britt's testimony under 404(b). 28 The
court held that Britt's testimony should not have been admitted by
the trial court to show "plan, knowledge, and intent" because it did
not suggest a plan connecting the car fire to the Destinations fire.29
In so holding, the court cited its reasoning in United States v.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. (citing United States v. Escobar de Jesus, 187 F.3d 148, 169 (1st
Cir. 1999)).
23. See id. at 121.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. 229 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2000).
27. See id. at 26; Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997).
28. See Varoudakis, 233 F.3d at 119-25.
29. See id. at 119.
SURVEY SECTION
Lynn3 o where it held that evidence of a prior conviction was not
admissible to show a common plan or scheme in a current prosecu-
tion unless there was evidence that the prior offense led progres-
sively to the current offense.31 In Varoudakis, Britt's testimony
did not suggest that such a "continuing or connected scheme"
linked the car fire and the Destinations fire.32
The court next considered the district court's determination
that the car fire evidence was "specially relevant" to the Destina-
tions fire as it helped establish the co-conspirator relationship be-
tween Varoudakis and Britt.33 The court determined that the
district court was correct in holding that prior bad act evidence is
admissible to prove conspiracy in cases where the earlier crime in-
volved the same participants as the first crime. 34 However, the
court stated that Britt did not participate in the car fire as a co-
conspirator. 35 She was merely a witness to the incident.36 In con-
trast, Britt actively participated in the Destinations act.3 7
Finally, the court determined that the trial court erred in ad-
mitting Britt's testimony to prove Varoudakis's motive for con-
structing the Destinations fire.38 The court stated that motive is
not an element of a crime that the government must prove, and
therefore proof of motive must be offered to show some other ele-
ment.39 The court found that in the present case the government
was attempting to state that Varoudakis's commission of the car
fire in response to financial stress makes it more likely that he
committed the restaurant arson in response to financial stress.40
Thus, the testimony was impermissible propensity evidence. 4'
Upon concluding its review of the trial court's bases for admit-
ting the car fire evidence, the court next stated a proper rationale
30. 856 F.2d 430, 435 (1st Cir. 1988).
31. See Varoudakis, 233 F.3d at 119.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id. (citing United States v. Hadfield, 918 F.2d 987, 994 (1st Cir. 1990)).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. The court describes Britt's participation in the Destinations fire as
helping remove restaurant equipment from the facility and paying the hired
arsonist.
38. See id. at 120.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
2001]
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for admitting the car fire evidence as 404(b) evidence. 42 The court
found that the evidence was relevant to the co-conspirator relation-
ship between Varoudakis and Britt because it helped to explain the
nature and development of their relationship.43 Because such evi-
dence could be properly admitted to show the character of their
relationship, the court held that a 403 analysis was necessary to
determine if the probative value of such evidence was substantially
outweighed by unfair prejudice."
The court determined that the probative value of the car fire
evidence offered to show the development of Varoudakis's and
Britt's relationship was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. 45 Britt testified at length about her relationship
with Varoudakis outside of the context of the car and Destinations
fires.46 Thus, the government did not need her testimony about
the car fire to demonstrate the close nature of the association.47
After completing its analysis, the court stated that only in ex-
ceptional circumstances would it reverse the informed discretion of
the trial court concerning the relative weighting of the probative
value and prejudicial effect of 404(b) evidence. 48 The court ruled
that Varoudakis was such a case. 49 The ruling of the trial court on
the admissibility of the car fire evidence must be reversed unless it
resulted in harmless error.50 Admission of prior bad acts evidence
is harmless only if it is highly probable that the error did not con-
tribute to the verdict.51
42. See id.
43. See id. at 121. The court found that the evidence shows Varoudakis's will-
ingness to commit a crime in Britt's presence, and therefore that their relationship
involved a certain level of trust.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 123-24.
46. See id. at 123. Britt testified that she began dating Varoudakis in 1985,
and that they had lived together for six years. Also, Britt was involved in the
financial matters of Destinations, including signing the company's bankruptcy
petition.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 124 (citing United States v. Griffin, 818 F.2d 97, 101-02 (1st Cir.
1987)).
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 125 (citing United States v. Aguilar-Aranceta, 58 F.3d 796, 802
(1st Cir. 1995)).
SURVEY SECTION
Applying this standard to the facts in Varoudakis, the court
found that the error in admissibility was not harmless.5 2 The
court stated that the evidence led to other testimony that bolstered
the credibility of Britt.53  The government's case against
Varoudakis would have been largely circumstantial had Britt been
discredited. 54 Also, the fact that the jury sent a note to the court
during the deliberations indicating it was at an impasse, and the
fact that the deliberations continued for three days, weighs against
a finding of harmless error.55
CONCLUSION
In United States v. Varoudakis, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit affirmed its narrow interpretation of
how and when Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prior bad act evi-
dence should be admitted in a criminal case. The court also illus-
trated that even when prior bad act evidence is deemed relevant to
the current criminal prosecution, it may nevertheless be inadmis-
sible due to the strict requirements of Rule 403.
Patricia K. Holmes
52. See id. at 126-27.
53. See id. at 126.
54. See id.
55. See id.
20011 729
730 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:593
Evidence. Votolato v. Merandi, 747 A.2d 455 (R.I. 2000). Evi-
dence of a settlement agreement for a tort is not admissible for
setoff and impeachment purposes when the settlement agreement
is not being used to prove liability of the parties to the action. Fur-
ther, the court reviewed the lower court's decision to grant a new
trial under a de novo standard because the decision involved a
question of law, clarifying the interpretation of amended Rule 59 of
the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Mary Ann Votolato (Votolato), individually and as the admin-
istratrix of her daughter (Tavares), sued the City of Providence
and a Providence police officer (Merandi) for negligence and the
resulting damages that came about when Merandi's police car
struck a car in which Tavares was a passenger and Parillo was the
driver.' Merandi was responding to a call; as a result of the acci-
dent, Tavares suffered massive injuries and was pronounced dead
upon arrival at the hospital.2 Votolato, on behalf of herself and her
daughter's estate, filed a civil action naming several defendants.3
Summary judgment was granted to all the other parties except
Merandi and the city.4 A jury returned a verdict in favor of the
defendants in January 1998.5
The plaintiff moved for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59 of the
Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, on the basis
that evidence concerning a prior settlement agreement between
herself and the insurance carrier of the driver of the car in which
Tavares was riding was improperly admitted.6 The assertion of
prejudice by the admission of a $95,00 settlement agreement al-
lowed in by the trial judge persuaded the judge to order a new
trial; the judge concluded that the curative instruction he had
given to the jury had been inadequate to prevent the prejudice. 7
The judge concluded he had made an error of law and the defend-
ants appealed the decision for a new trial.8
1. See Votolato v. Merandi, 747 A.2d 455, 458 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 458-59.
6. See id. at 459.
7. See id.
8. See id.
SURVEY SECTION
The defendants claimed, on appeal, that the court should re-
view the decision de novo because of the error of law committed by
the superior court judge.9 Further, they argued that the evidence
was properly admitted to the jury in order to offset any award
given.' 0 In the alternative, they argued that the settlement was
properly admitted to show bias and impeachment and even if there
was an error, the judge's curative instruction made up for any
harmless error."
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The first question the court addressed concerned the standard
of review appropriate for reviewing the trial judge's decision to
grant a new trial. The defendants argued that because the deci-
sion to order a new trial was based on amended Rule 59(a)(1), the
appropriate level of review was de novo as opposed to a more tradi-
tional, deferential standard.' 2 However, the court recognized that
the 1995 amendment to Rule 59 was a departure from Rhode Is-
land tradition because it expanded the grounds for the grant of a
new trial. 13 The amendments also brought the Rhode Island rule
into conformity with its federal counterpart. 14 Importantly, the
court reasoned that federal interpretations of substantially similar
rules of civil procedure "should serve as a guide to the construction
of our own rule."' 5 Therefore, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
turned to the United States Supreme Court for guidance on the
standard of review for an alleged error of law at trial; the Court
has addressed the topic by opining that a court "by definition
abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law."' 6
The court found the federal standard to be in accord with
Rhode Island's well-settled standard as it relates to an abuse of
discretion by a trial judge in ordering a new trial.' 7 The standard
includes the review necessary to determine that the discretion was
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 459.
13. See id. at 460.
14. See id.
15. Id. (quoting Hall v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 727 A.2d 667, 669 (R.I. 1999)).
16. Id. (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996)).
17. See, e.g., Kwarciak v. Star Market, 506 A.2d 545, 548 (R.I. 1986).
20011
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not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.18 Therefore, the court
found it necessary to review the grant and the accompanying trial
record de novo when dealing with an abuse of discretion question,
just like any other question of law.19 To strengthen support for its
position, the court noted that de novo review by the court was ap-
propriate because it is in the best position to decide the merits of a
question of law.20 Because the Rhode Island Supreme Court is the
court of last resort in Rhode Island, it has a duty to be the "final
arbiter of the efficacy, interpretation, and applicability of the laws
of this state ... ."21 The trial court judge is best in a position to
make factual determinations regarding the weight of evidence and
credibility of witnesses when it serves as the super seventh juror.22
The Rhode Island Supreme Court decided to reaffirm the well set-
tled and effective system of jurisprudence concerning Rule 59(a) in
holding that a trial judge's decision concerning the grant of a new
trial for factual reasons will not generally be disturbed unless the
judge misconceived or overlooked material evidence or was other-
wise clearly wrong.23 But a trial judge's decision to order a new
trial because of a perceived error of law will be reviewed de novo to
determine if, in fact, an error of law exists in the record.24
The court noted that, generally, offers to compromise and evi-
dence of settlement negotiations are inadmissible into evidence. 25
One reason is the promotion of alternatives to litigation, 26 even ex-
tending between plaintiffs and third party tortfeasors. 27 This
practice follows Rule 408 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. 28
The issue of first impression for the court centered around admis-
sion of evidence of a settlement agreement being used for setoff or
18. See Votolato, 747 A.2d at 460 (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 100).
19. See id.
20. See id. (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559-60 (1988)).
21. Id. at 461 (quoting Corrado v. Providence Redevelopment Agency, 370
A.2d 226, 230 (R.I. 1977)).
22. See id. (citing Morroco v. Piccardi, 713 A.2d 250, 253 (R.I. 1998)).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. (citing Vingi v. Trillo, 73 A.2d 43, 45 (R.I. 1950)).
26. See id. (citing Salter v. R.I. Co., 60 A. 588, 589 (1905)).
27. See id. (citing McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 247 (1st Cir. 1985)).
28. See id. The rule states in relevant part: "Evidence of [ ] furnishing ... or
accepting. . . a valuable consideration in compromising... a claim which was dis-
puted . . . is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount... [and) does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for an-
other purpose, such as proving bias .... ." Id.
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impeachment, rather than liability, under Rule 408.29 The tradi-
tional rule in Rhode Island is to allow the plaintiff to file a motion
in limine, having the evidence of a third party settlement excluded
at trial against a remaining defendant.30 The judge then accord-
ingly reduces the jury award. 3 '
Only a minority of jurisdictions follow the "jury rule," which
allows the jury to hear about the settlement agreement in calculat-
ing damages. 32 However, the court ruled that the proper practice
to follow was to exclude evidence of a settlement agreement unless
the evidence is relevant to some other issue than damages.
33
Therefore, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the lower
court judge had properly and dutifully handled his error of law,
concluding that settlement evidence was not admissible for setoff
purposes pursuant to Rule 408, when he ordered a new trial.
34
The court still had to resolve the issues of admission under
Rule 408 to show impeachment or bias.35 The court found the
First Circuit analysis in Mclnnis v. A.M.F., Inc.36 instructive in the
interpretation of Rule 408.3 7 The Mclnnis court noted that the
critical inquiry was the purpose for which the settlement agree-
ment evidence was admitted at trial.38 The court in this case
found that the evidence was being used to show that either the
third party tortfeasor was more than partially responsible for the
fatal injuries or that the plaintiff was highly litigious. 3 9 The court
held neither of those rationales to be relevant and both to be highly
prejudicial.40 The Rhode Island Supreme Court was of the opinion
that Rhode Island case law and Rule 408 specifically proscribes ad-
mitting evidence concerning the apportionment of fault among
tortfeasors via a settlement agreement.4 1 The rationale of such a
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 461-62 (citing Morea v. Cosco, Inc., 664 N.E.2d 822 (Mass.
1996)).
33. See id. at 462.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 463.
36. 765 F.2d 240 (1st Cir. 1985).
37. See Votolato, 747 A.2d at 463.
38. See id. (citing Mclnnis, 765 F.2d at 248).
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. (citing Vingi, 73 A.2d at 45).
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rule lies in the notion that an injured person is entitled to be made
whole and that it should be of no concern to the tortfeasor that
someone other than the tortfeasor has aided the injured person.42
Thus, the court was convinced that the evidence to show bias
or impeachment could not have been properly admitted.43 Also,
the admission of the evidence could have shown that the plaintiff
had a litigious disposition and "is precisely the type of character
evidence Rule 404(b) was designed to exclude." 44 Therefore, the
court concluded that there was an intention to create an inference
in the minds of the jury that Parillo was more than partially re-
sponsible for the injuries, a clear violation of Rule 408, or, that
Parillo was a very litigious person, a violation of Rule 404(b). 45 As
a result, the trial judge was correct to find that the previously in-
troduced settlement evidence was impermissible for setoff or im-
peachment purposes and was correct to grant the motion for a new
trial.46
Lastly, the defendants argued that the curative instructions
given by the trial judge to the jury was sufficient to make any error
he might have made harmless. 47 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court reviewed the trial record and could not rule that the trial
judge had erred when he concluded that his untimely jury instruc-
tions had not removed prejudice toward the plaintiff.48 Therefore,
the court concluded that the "somewhat general" curative instruc-
tion was neither timely nor effective in removing the taint of the
settlement agreement from the minds of the jurors.4 9 The defen-
dant's appeal was denied and the judgment appealed from was
affirmed.5 0
CONCLUSION
In Votolato v. Merandi, the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled
that evidence of a prior settlement agreement is not admissible for
42. See id. (quoting Gelsomino v. Mendonca, 723 A.2d 300, 301 (R.I. 1999)).
43. See id.
44. Id. at 464 (quoting DeChristofaro v. Machala, 685 A.2d 258, 265 (R.I.
1996)).
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 465.
50. See id.
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setoff purposes, to show impeachment, to show bias, or to show
that the plaintiff was highly litigious. Further, the court ruled
that the trial judge's decision to grant a new trial involved a ques-
tion of law, and thus, the record was subject to de novo review.
Finally, the trial judge did not err when he ordered a new trial
because of his reasoning that his curative instructions were inef-
fective to remove juror prejudice.
Stephen P. Cooney
